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In	   the	   Single	   Market	   Act	   of	   October	   2010	   the	   European	   Commission	   announced	   its	   intention	   to	  
introduce	   legislative	   proposals	   for	   “simplifying	   and	   updating”	   the	   EU’s	   procurement	   regime,	  
including	  to	  make	  the	  award	  of	  contracts	  “more	  flexible”,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  enable	  public	  contracts	  to	  be	  
better	   used	   to	   support	   other	   EU	   policies2.	   A	   consultation	   was	   launched	   with	   the	   publication	   in	  
January	  2011	  of	  the	  Green	  Paper	  on	  the	  modernisation	  of	  EU	  public	  procurement	  policy:	  Towards	  a	  
more	   efficient	   European	   Procurement	  Market3.	   Following	   on	   from	   this,	   on	   20	  December	   2011	   the	  
Commission	  published	  its	  proposals4	  for	  two	  new	  procedural	  directives	  on	  public	  procurement,	  one	  5	  
to	  replace	  Public	  Sector	  Directive	  2004/18	  and	  one6	  to	  replace	  Utilities	  Directive	  2004/17,	  with	  the	  
stated	  aims	  of	  “simplification”	  and	  “flexibilisation”	  (sic)	  of	  the	  rules	  to	  improve	  value	  for	  money7.	  At	  
the	   same	   time,	   the	   culmination	   of	   work	   going	   back	   to	   20048,	   the	   Commission	   also	   published	   a	  
proposal	  for	  a	  new	  directive	  to	  regulate	  the	  award	  of	  concessions9.	  
However,	   following	   the	  pattern	  of	   the	  previous	   reforms	   in	  200410,	  whilst	   the	  proposals	  do	   indeed	  
provide	  for	  some	  additional	  flexibility,	  they	  have	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  many	  respects	  introduced	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  article	  is	  based	  on	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  “Understanding	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  EU’s	  procurement	  directives:	  the	  
limited	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  regime	  and	  some	  proposals	  for	  reform”,	  forthcoming	  in	  a	  book	  to	  be	  published	  by	  the	  
Swedish	  Competition	  Authority.	  	  
2	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Regions:	  Towards	  a	  Single	  Market	  Act	  –	  For	  a	  highly	  competitive	  social	  
market	  economy,	  COM	  (2010)	  608	  
3	  (COM	  (2011)	  15	  final).	  Parallel	  with	  this,	  the	  Commission	  has	  undertaken	  an	  empirical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  
impact	  and	  cost	  of	  EU	  procurement	  policy,	  which	  has	  been	  published	  in	  full	  and	  summary	  form	  at	  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/executive-­‐summary_en.pdf	  
4	  For	  a	  summary	  see	  R.	  Williams,	  “Commission	  Proposals	  to	  Modernise	  Procurement”	  (2012)	  21	  P.P.L.R.	  
NA101.	  
5	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  public	  procurement	  	  COM	  (2011)	  896	  final.	  
6	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  procurement	  by	  entities	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  postal	  services	  
sectors	  	  COM	  (2011)	  895	  final.	  
7	  See	  e.g.	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  public	  procurement,	  p.2.	  	  	  
8	  See,	  in	  particular,	  European	  Commission,	  Green	  Paper	  on	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  and	  Community	  law	  on	  
public	  contracts	  and	  concessions	  COM(2004)	  327	  final;	  and	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  
European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  the	  European	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  
Regions	  on	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnerships	  and	  Community	  Law	  on	  Public	  Procurement	  and	  Concessions	  COM	  
(2005)	  569	  final.	  
9	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  the	  award	  of	  concession	  contracts	  COM (2011) 897 final	  
10	  See	  S.	  Arrowsmith, “An	  Assessment	  of	  the	  New	  Legislative	  Package	  on	  Public	  Procurement”	  (2004)	  41	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rigidity	  and	  burdensome	  requirements	  for	  Member	  States11.	  Furthermore,	  these	  and	  other	  changes	  
proposed	  will	  result	  in	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  which	  is	  vastly	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  current	  regime	  that	  the	  
proposals	  purport	  to	  simplify12.	  If	  these	  proposals	  are	  adopted	  the	  resulting	  regime	  will	  truly	  be	  (to	  
borrow	  a	  phrase	  used	  by	  Cirell	  and	  Bennett	  to	  describe	  the	  old	  Compulsory	  Competitive	  Tendering	  
regime	  of	  the	  UK	  government)	  a	  “Frankenstein’s	  monster”13.	  	  	  	  
In	   this	  context,	   this	  article	  proposes	  a	  simple	  blueprint	   for	  reforming	  the	  directives	  to	  achieve	  real	  
simplicity	  and	  flexibility	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  single	  directive	  for	  all	  regulated	  contracts	  that	  is	  based	  on	  
the	  Utilities	  Directive.	  	  
It	   is	   submitted	   that	   this	   approach	   will	   ensure	   a	   real	   simplification	   of	   the	   current	   procurement	  
directives	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  reducing	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  regime.	  It	  will	  also	  provide	  for	  the	  greater	  
flexibility	   for	   Member	   States	   that	   is	   recognised	   as	   one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   current	   reform	  
programme.	   This	   approach	   will	   provide	   for	   slightly	   more	   flexibility	   for	   Member	   States	   than	   is	  
envisaged	   in	   the	  Commission’s	  proposals,	   but	   it	   is	   submitted	   that	   this	  needed	   to	  provide	  a	  better	  
balance	   between	   the	   directives’	   objective	   of	   promoting	   a	   single	   market	   and	   Member	   States’	  
interests	  in	  regulating	  public	  procurement	  for	  national	  objectives.	  Fundamental	  to	  this	  balance	  is	  the	  
important	  point,	  often	  misunderstood14,	  that	  the	  author	  has	  elaborated	  elsewhere,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  an	  
objective	  of	  the	  directives	  to	  ensure	  value	  for	  money	   in	  procurement15.	   	  This	  remains	  a	  matter	   for	  
Member	   States,	   and	   internal	  market	  measures	   adopted	  by	   the	   EU	  must	   take	   account	   of	  Member	  
States’	  interests	  in	  this	  area,	  as	  well	  as	  others,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality.	  In	  
this	  respect,	  it	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  transparency	  rules	  at	  EU	  level	  may	  inhibit	  limit	  the	  ability	  
of	  Member	  States	  to	  pursue	  value	  for	  money	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  preferences	  and	  different	  
circumstances,	   such	   as	   their	   differing	   levels	   of	   corruption	   and	   differing	   levels	   of	   expertise	   of	  
purchasing	  officers.	  The	  proposals	  made	  below	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  author’s	  view	  that,	  whilst	  
a	   degree	   of	   transparency	   is	   certainly	   useful,	   there	   are	   also	   significant	   limits	   on	   the	   value	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  A	  few	  examples	  are	  a	  proposal	  to	  apply	  the	  full	  rules	  of	  t	  he	  directive	  to	  almost	  all	  services	  by	  removing	  the	  
current	  exemption	  from	  most	  rules	  that	  applies	  to	  Part	  B	  services;	  a	  requirement	  for	  verification	  of	  criteria	  
which	  seems	  to	  apply	  in	  all	  cases	  and	  will	  impose	  significant	  and	  unreasonable	  burden	  on	  purchasers	  and	  
suppliers;	  formal	  procedures	  before	  contractors	  can	  be	  excluded	  for	  deficient	  performance	  of	  previous	  
contracts;	  an	  obligation	  to	  exclude	  for	  non-­‐payment	  of	  taxes	  and	  social	  security	  contributions;	  and	  
requirements	  for	  purchasers	  to	  divide	  certain	  contracts	  into	  lots	  or	  justify	  their	  failure	  to	  do	  so:	  see,	  
respectively,	  Article	  66(4),	  Article	  55(3),	  Article	  55(1)	  and	  Article	  44	  of	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  new	  directive	  on	  
public	  procurement.	  
12	  Reducing	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  the	  burden	  on	  participants	  was	  one	  element	  of	  simplicity	  
needed	  that	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  report	  by	  Mario	  Monti	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  of	  9	  
May	  2010,	  "A	  new	  strategy	  for	  the	  Single	  Market	  –	  at	  the	  service	  of	  Europe’s	  economy	  and	  
society"(http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf)	  which	  preceded	  the	  
Communication	  Towards	  a	  Single	  Market	  Act,	  note	  2	  above.	  The	  concept	  of	  simplicity	  	  is	  used	  in	  the	  present	  
article	  to	  refer	  simply	  to	  	  absence	  of	  complexity.	  
13	  S.	  Cirell	  and	  J.	  Bennett	  in	  the	  looseleaf	  publication	  formerly	  called	  CCT:	  Law	  and	  Practice,	  A11	  (1996	  version).	  	  
14	  See	  further	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  “Understanding	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  EU’s	  procurement	  directives:	  the	  limited	  role	  
of	  the	  EU	  regime	  and	  some	  proposals	  for	  reform”	  (see	  fn.1)	  and,	  more	  briefly,	  	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  The	  Law	  of	  
Public	  and	  Utilities	  Procurement	  (2nd	  edn.	  Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  2005),	  Ch.3.	  
15	  See	  S. Arrowsmith, “The EC Procurement Directives, National Procurement Policies and Better Governance: The 
Case for a New Approach” (2002) 27 European Law Review 3.	  
transparency	   –	   and,	   in	   particular,	   of	   very	   detailed	   transparency	   rules	   that	   limit	   the	   discretion	   of	  
procuring	  entities	  –	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  achieving	  the	  single	  market	  objectives	  themselves16.	  	  
The	  author	  has	  previously	  suggested	  a	  more	  radical	  reform	  of	  the	  directives	  than	  is	  proposed	  here,	  
whereby	  procurement	   in	  Member	  States	  would	  be	  regulated	  only	  by	  the	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
general	  principles	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  transparency,	  rather	  than	  through	  specific	  
transparency	  rules,	  using	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  enforcement	  and	  evaluation	  to	  secure	  adherence	  to	  the	  
Treaty	  principles17.	  In	  the	  author’s	  view,	  this	  remains	  preferable.	  However,	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  such	  
an	  approach	  is	  politically	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  than	  one	  which	  accepts	  the	  basic	  approach	  
of	   the	   current	  directives	  and	   focuses	  merely	  on	   reforming	   their	   contents.	   Thus	   the	  present	  article	  
focuses	  on	  how	  to	  achieve	  simplification	  and	  flexibility	  within	  the	  broad	  parameters	  of	  the	  existing	  
approach	  to	  regulation.	  
	  
2.	  The	  basic	  principle:	  a	  single	  directive	  based	  on	  the	  current	  Utilities	  Directive	  
It	  is	  submitted	  that	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  any	  reform	  should	  be	  to	  consolidate	  all	  three	  of	  the	  current	  
substantive	   directives	   –	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive,	   Utilities	   Directive,	   and	   Defence	   and	   Security	  
Directive	   (Directive	  2009/81)	  –	   into	  one	  single	  directive,	   the	  contents	  of	  which	  would	  be	  based	  on	  
the	  current	  Utilities	  Directive.	  This	   single	  directive	  would	  be	  applied	   in	  principle	   to	  all	  entities	  and	  
activities	  covered	  by	  the	  current	  directives.	  	  
A	  single	  directive	  of	  this	  kind	  would	  also	  be	  entirely	  suitable	  for	  regulating	  the	  award	  of	  concession	  
contracts,	   including	   services	   concessions	   that	   are	   currently	   excluded	   from	   the	   procurement	  
directives.	   Thus	   it	   would	   not	   be	   necessary	   to	   introduce	   an	   entirely	   new	   instrument	   to	   regulate	  
concessions,	  but	  simply	  to	  amend	  the	  current	  rules	  that	  apply	  to	  utilities	  regarding	  the	  extent	  and	  
manner	  of	  their	  application	  to	  concessions.	  
It	   is	   suggested	  also	   that	   there	   should	  be	  a	   single	   set	  of	   rules	  on	   remedies18,	   applying	   to	  all	   award	  
procedures	  covered	  by	  the	  single	  substantive	  directive.	  
Such	  a	  reform	  would	  improve	  flexibility	  and	  bring	  about	  very	  considerable	  simplification	  of	  the	  rules-­‐	  
thus	  effectively	  promoting	  the	  two	  main	  goals	  of	  the	  current	  reform	  programme	  -­‐	  and	  also	  have	  the	  
advantage	  of	  removing	  anomalies	  from	  the	  regime.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  See	  further	  the	  works	  cited	  in	  notes	  15	  and	  16	  above;	  and,	  more	  generally,	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  
transparency	  and	  other	  procurement	  objectives,	  S.	  Kelman	  in	  Procurement	  and	  Public	  Management	  (AEI	  Press;	  
1990);	  S.	  Kelman,	  “Remaking	  Federal	  Procurement”	  (2002)	  31	  Public	  Contract	  Law	  Journal	  581;	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  
J.	  Linarelli	  and	  D.	  Wallace,	  Regulating	  Public	  Procurement:	  National	  and	  International	  Perspectives	  (London:	  
Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2000),	  p.72	  et	  seq;;	  S.	  Schooner,	  “Commercial	  Purchasing:	  the	  Chasm	  between	  the	  
United	  States	  Government’s	  Evolving	  Policy	  and	  Practice”,	  Ch.	  8	  in	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  and	  M.	  Trybus	  (eds.),	  Public	  
Procurement:	  the	  Continuing	  Revolution	  (London:	  Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2002);	  S.	  Schooner,	  “Fear	  of	  
Oversight:	  the	  Fundamental	  Failure	  of	  Businesslike	  Government”	  (2001)	  50	  American	  University	  Law	  Review	  
627;	  J.	  Schwartz,	  “Regulation	  and	  Deregulation	  in	  Public	  Procurement	  Law	  Reform	  in	  the	  United	  States”,	  Chap.	  
8	  in	  G.	  Piga	  and	  K.	  Thai	  (eds.),	  Advancing	  Public	  Procurement:	  Practices,	  Innovation	  and	  Knowledge-­‐sharing	  
(Boca	  Rato:	  PRAcademics	  Press	  2007).	  
17	  Arrowsmith,	  “The	  EC	  Procurement	  Directives…”,	  note	  15	  above.	  
18	  Instead	  of	  the	  current	  two	  directives	  89/665	  and	  92/13.	  
3.	  Flexibility	  
The	   change	   proposed	   above	   would,	   first,	   achieve	   the	   flexibility	   goal	   of	   the	   current	   reform	  
programme,	  specifically	  by	  giving	  much	  greater	   flexibility	  to	  member	  States	   for	  contracts	  currently	  
covered	  by	  the	  general	  Public	  Sector	  Directive.	  
In	   this	   respect	   it	   would,	   first,	   provide	   for	   more	   flexibility	   for	  Member	   States	   to	   pursue	   value	   for	  
money	  objectives	  in	  the	  way	  best	  suited	  to	  their	  own	  situation.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  current	  Utilities	  
Directive	   does	   not	   impose	   such	   significant	   limitations	   as	   the	   other	   directives	   on	   the	   discretion	   in	  
decision-­‐making	   that	  may	  be	  given	  by	  Member	  States	   to	   their	  procuring	  entities	  and	  officers,	   and	  
because	   it	   allows	   use	   of	   procurement	   tools	   that	   are	   generally	   prohibited	   for	   the	   public	   sector	  
because	  of	  their	  perceived	  impact	  on	  market	  access.	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  first	  point,	  the	  Utilities	  Directive	  allows,	   in	  particular,	  a	  free	  choice	  over	  whether	  to	  
use	   the	   open	   procedure,	   restricted	   procedure	   and	   negotiated	   procedure	  with	   a	   notice19,	   the	   last	  
permitting	   a	   general	   freedom	   to	   negotiate	   with	   suppliers,	   subject	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   equal	  
treatment20.	  	  As	  we	  have	  noted	  above,	  negotiations	  can	  potentially	  help	  ensure	  value	  for	  money	  for	  
various	   reasons;	  and	  adopting	   this	  approach	   for	  all	   regulated	  procurement	  would	  enable	  Member	  
States	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  possibilities	  of	  negotiation	  for	  their	  own	  procuring	  entities	  in	  all	  situations	  
in	  which	  they	  consider	  that	  this	  is	  useful.	  (It	  also	  gives	  Member	  States	  the	  possibility	  to	  remove	  the	  
uncertainty	  that	  applies	   in	  the	  current	  Public	  Sector	  Directive	  over	  when	  negotiations	  are	  possible,	  
which	   arises	   both	   from	   the	   uncertainty	   over	   when	   the	   negotiated	   procedure	   and	   competitive	  
dialogue	  are	  available21,	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  negotiations	  are	  permitted	  in	  
the	   different	   procedures22).	   The	   Utilities	   Directive	   also	   seems	   to	   allow	   more	   useful	   flexibility	   to	  
Member	  States	  in	  drawing	  up	  criteria	  for	  choosing	  which	  firms	  are	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  tender	  (relevant	  
for	   restricted	   and	   negotiated	   procedures)	   when	   there	   are	   more	   firms	   meeting	   the	   qualification	  
(“suitability”)	  criteria	  for	  participation	  than	  the	  procuring	  entity	  wishes	  to	  invite23.	  	  	  
As	   regards	   the	   second	   point,	   unlike	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive,	   the	   Utilities	   Directive	   allows,	   in	  
particular,	   the	   use	   of	   general	   notices	   and	   notices	   of	   qualification	   systems	   to	   advertise	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Utilities	  Directive	  2004/17,	  Article	  40.	  
20	  On	  this	  procedure	  see	  Arrowsmith,	  The	  Law	  of	  Public	  and	  Utilities	  Procurement	  note	  13	  above,	  chapter	  16.	  
21	  On	  negotiated	  procedures	  in	  this	  respect	  see	  Arrowsmith	  (ed.),	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  (ed.),	  Introduction	  to	  EU	  
Procurement	  Law,	  available	  at	  www.nottingham.ac.uk,	  section	  6.11	  and	  on	  competitive	  dialogue;	  
S.Arrowsmith	  and	  S.Treumer	  (eds.),	  Competitive	  Dialogue	  in	  EU	  Procurement	  Law	  (forthcoming;	  CUP),	  chapter	  
1,	  section	  4;	  Arrowsmith,	  note	  30	  above,	  pp.632-­‐635;	  S.	  Treumer,	  “The	  Field	  of	  Application	  of	  Competitive	  
Dialogue”	  (2006)	  15	  P.P.L.R.	  307;	  A.	  Brown,	  “The	  Impact	  of	  the	  New	  Directive	  on	  Large	  Infrastructure	  Projects:	  
Competitive	  Dialogue	  or	  Better	  the	  Devil	  You	  Know?”	  (2004)	  13	  P.P.L.R.	  160;	  M.	  Burnett,	  ’Developing	  a	  
Complexity	  test	  for	  the	  Use	  of	  Competitive	  Dialogue	  for	  PPP	  Contracts	  (2010)	  4	  E.P.P.P.L.	  (2010)	  215.	  
22	  On	  pre-­‐tender	  negotiations	  in	  open	  and	  restricted	  procedures	  see	  S.	  Treumer	  “Technical	  Dialogue	  and	  the	  
Principle	  of	  Equal	  Treatment	  –	  Dealing	  with	  Conflicts	  of	  Interest	  after	  Fabricom”	  (2007)	  16	  Public	  Procurement	  
Law	  Review	  99;	  S.	  Treumer,	  “Technical	  Dialogue	  Prior	  to	  Submission	  of	  Tenders	  and	  the	  Principe	  of	  Equal	  
Treatment	  of	  Tenderers”	  (1999)	  8	  Public	  Procurement	  Law	  Review	  147.	  On	  post-­‐tender	  negotiations	  in	  these	  
procedures	  see	  the	  works	  cited	  in	  note	  74	  above;	  and	  on	  post-­‐tender	  negotiations	  in	  competitive	  dialogue	  
Arrowsmith	  and	  Treumer	  (eds.),	  note	  21,	  chapter	  1,	  section	  5.	  
23	  The	  main	  requirement	  is	  for	  selection	  to	  be	  based	  on	  objective	  rules	  and	  criteria,	  stated	  in	  Article	  54.	  
However,	  there	  are	  uncertainties	  over	  what	  this	  means	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  directive:	  see,	  in	  detail,	  S.	  
Arrowsmith	  and	  C.	  Maund,	  “CSR	  in	  the	  Utilities	  Sector	  and	  the	  Implications	  of	  EC	  Procurement	  Policy:	  A	  
Framework	  for	  Debate”,	  ch.11	  in	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  and	  P.	  Kunzlik	  (eds),	  Social	  and	  Environmental	  Policies	  in	  EC	  
Procurement	  Law:	  New	  Directives	  and	  New	  Directions	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2009)	  436.	  	  
procurement,	   rather	   than	   requiring	  a	  notice	  of	  each	  specific	  procurement24,	  which	  can	   reduce	   the	  
costs	   of	   procurement.	   It	   also,	   very	   significantly,	   allows	   use	   of	   mandatory	   “qualification	   systems”	  
(that	   is,	   it	   allows	   access	   to	   procurements	   to	   be	   restricted	   to	   those	   on	   qualification	   systems),	  
provided	  that	  certain	  rigorous	  conditions	  are	  observed	  regarding	  transparency	  (in	  various	  aspects)	  of	  
the	  systems25	   .	  Qualification	  systems	  can	  be	  very	  valuable	  both	   in	  enhancing	  value	   for	  money	   (for	  
example,	  by	  allowing	  procuring	  entities	  to	  work	  closely	  with	   its	  best	  suppliers	  to	   improve	  products	  
and	  services)	  and	  reducing	  costs	  and	  delays	  in	  procurement26.	  It	  should	  be	  stressed	  that	  it	  should	  be	  
for	  Member	  States	  themselves	  to	  make	  the	  choice	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  allow	  their	  entities	  use	  of	  
these	  new	  flexibilities,	  taking	  account	  of	  their	  own	  circumstances.	  	  
Applying	   a	   utilities-­‐type	   regime	   more	   broadly	   would	   also	   potentially	   remove	   other	   unjustified	  
limitations	  that	  might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  applying	  in	  the	  extensive	  (and	  rather	  ambiguous)	  provisions	  
of	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive.	   An	   example	   of	   this	   can	   be	   seen	   by	   referring	   to	   the	   explicit	   and	  
exhaustive27	   list	   of	   evidence	   in	  Article	   48(2)	   of	   that	   directive	   that	  may	  be	  demanded	  of	   economic	  
operators.	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  closed	   list	  of	  permitted	  evidence	   is	  of	   limited	  value.	  However,	   the	   list	  
may,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   make	   it	   difficult	   for	   contracting	   authorities	   to	   seek	   evidence	   of	   certain	  
matters	   that	   are	   in	   fact	   relevant	   and	   appropriate	   for	   assessing	   technical	   ability	   to	   perform	   the	  
contract,	   unless	   (which	   is	   not	   clear)	   Article	   48(5)	   allowing	   the	   evaluation	   of	   “skills,	   efficiency,	  
experience	   and	   reliability”	   for	   certain	   operations	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   overriding	   the	   need	   for	  
evidence	   called	   for	   to	   fall	   within	   the	   explicit	   list.	   The	  main	   value	   of	   removing	   such	   provisions,	   as	  
discussed	   below,	   would	   be	   its	   value	   to	   simplification,	   but	   it	   might	   also	   remove	   some	   unjustified	  
obstacles	  to	  obtaining	  value	  for	  money.	  	  	  
We	   can	   note	   that	   the	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Directive	   already	   provides	   for	   some	   of	   the	   flexibility	  
offered	  by	  the	  Utilities	  Directive,	  notably	  in	  the	  possibility	  it	  gives,	  like	  the	  Utilities	  Directive,	  for	  use	  
of	  the	  negotiated	  procedure	  with	  a	  notice	  for	  any	  procurement28.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  
other	   important	   flexibilities,	  notably	   the	   flexible	  methods	  of	  advertising	  and	  the	  use	  of	  mandatory	  
qualification	  systems.	  The	  latter,	   it	   is	  submitted,	  could	  be	  of	  particular	  value	  in	  the	  defence	  sector:	  
they	   provide	   the	   best	   opportunity	   for	   thorough	   assessment	   of	   supplier	   capability	   (including	   on	  
security	  matters)	  within	   an	   adequate	   time	   scale,	   rather	   than	   requiring	   this	   to	  be	   fitted	  within	   the	  
timescales	  of	  each	  specific	  procurement;	  and	  they	  also	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  contracting	  authorities	  
to	   work	   closely	   with	   their	   best	   suppliers	   to	   encourage	   development	   and	   innovation,	   as	   has	  
happened	  in	  the	  utilities	  sector.	  	  
In	   addition,	   applying	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   utilities	   regime	   to	   procurement	   governed	   by	   this	   directive	  
would	  also	  improve	  the	  rules	  on	  use	  of	  an	  open	  form	  of	  tendering	  for	  contracts	  currently	  covered	  by	  
that	  directive,	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  a	  procedure	  that	  gives	  all	   interested	  and	  qualified	   firms	  a	  chance	  of	  
winning	  the	  contract	  based	  on	  a	  tender.	  The	  open	  procedure	  that	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Utilities	  Directive	  Article	  42.	  
25	  Utilities	  Directive	  Article	  53.	  
26	  On	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  these	  systems	  see	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  Government	  Procurement	  in	  the	  WTO	  (2003,	  
London:	  Kluwer	  Law	  International),	  pp.232-­‐236.	  
27	  The	  exhaustive	  nature	  of	  the	  list	  was	  established	  in	  Case	  76/81,	  S.A.	  Transporoute	  et	  Travaux	  v	  Minister	  of	  
Public	  Works	  [1982]	  ECR	  417	  and	  Joined	  Cases	  27-­‐29/86,	  S.A.	  Construction	  et	  Entreprises	  Industrielles	  (CEI)	  and	  
others	  v	  Société	  Coopérative	  "Association	  Intercommunales	  pour	  les	  Autoroutes	  des	  Ardennes"	  and	  others	  ("CEI	  
and	  Bellini")	  [1987]	  ECR	  3347.	  
28	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive,	  Article	  25.	  
the	  Utilities	  Directive	  was	  not	  been	  included	  at	  all	  in	  the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive,	  apparently	  
because	  it	  was	  considered	  unsuitable	  for	  defence	  and	  security	  procurement.	  However,	  as	  Heuninckx	  
has	  argued29,	  this	  is	  far	  from	  the	  case,	  in	  that	  there	  may	  at	  least	  some	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  number	  of	  
potential	  tenderers	  is	  limited	  and	  the	  procuring	  entity	  prefers	  to	  invite	  all	  those	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  
tendering.	   Further,	   a	   procuring	   entity	   might	   prefer	   to	   use	   an	   open	   procedure	   to	   encourage	  
participation	  by	  suppliers	  who	  might	   fear	  abuse	  of	   the	  selection	  stage	   if	  a	  negotiated	  or	  restricted	  
procedure	  were	  used.	   It	   seems	   rather	   surprising	   that	   the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive	  does	  not	  
explicitly	  include	  a	  procedure	  that	  might	  be	  useful	  in	  some	  cases	  for	  Member	  States	  to	  obtain	  value	  
for	  money	   and	  which	   also	   is	   the	  most	   transparent	   in	   the	   directives,	   given	   the	   emphasis	   that	   the	  
directives	  generally	  place	  on	  transparency	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  single	  market.	  
An	   open-­‐type	   procedure	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   using	   a	   restricted	   procedure	   in	  which	   the	   procuring	  
entity	  indicates	  in	  advance	  that	  it	  will	  consider	  all	  those	  interested	  who	  meet	  the	  suitability	  criteria	  
and	  will	   not	   further	   reduce	   numbers	   by	   inviting	   only	   some	   of	   those	   to	   tender.	   However,	   such	   an	  
approach	  would	   still	   differ	   from	   the	  open	  procedure	  of	   the	  directives	   in	   that	   it	  would	   in	  principle	  
probably	   require	   attention	   of	   suitability	   prior	   to	   tendering30	   (unlike	   the	   open	   procedure	   which	  
actually	   precludes	   this	   prior	   to	   submission	   of	   tenders),	   which	   could	   involve	   unnecessary	   costs.	  
Applying	   the	   current	   utilities	   rules	   to	   procurement	   covered	  by	   the	  Defence	   and	   Security	  Directive	  
would	   both	   clarify	   the	   availability	   of	   an	   “open”	   approach	   as	   well	   as	   providing	   access	   to	   the	  
advantages	   of	   the	   open	   procedure	   itself.	   This	   would	   again	   increase	   flexibility	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  
enhancing	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  Member	  States	  (although	  allowing	  them,	  of	  course,	  the	  flexibility	  
to	  use	  less	  rigid	  procedures	  than	  the	  open	  procedure	  should	  they	  choose	  to	  do	  so).	  
The	   procedures	   of	   the	   current	   Utilities	   Directive	   would	   also	   give	   sufficient	   flexibility	   for	  Member	  
States	  to	  pursue	  value	  for	  money	  in	  the	  award	  of	  concession	  arrangements.	  There	  is,	  in	  the	  author’s	  
view,	   no	   justification	   to	  make	   a	   distinction	   between	   concessions	   and	   other	   arrangements	   from	   a	  
procurement	  perspective.	   The	   special	   treatment	  of	   concessions	  arose	   for	  purely	  historical	   reasons	  
and	   many	   other	   complex	   contracts,	   notably	   privately	   financed	   infrastructure	   contracts,	   present	  
exactly	  the	  same	  features	  as	  concession	  arrangements	  so	  far	  as	  procurement	  issues	  are	  concerned	  –	  
for	   example,	   bids	   by	   consortia,	   long	   terms	   for	   the	   agreement,	   and	   uncertainty	   over	   the	   best	  
technical,	  financial	  and	  legal	  solutions	  due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  projects.	  A	  single	  directive	  based	  
on	  the	  utilities	  rules	  that,	  in	  particular,	  allows	  free	  use	  of	  the	  negotiated	  procedure,	  would	  provide	  
entirely	   suitable	   award	   procedures	   for	   all	   concessions,	   eliminating	   the	   need	   for	   any	   separate	  
regulatory	  instrument	  on	  concessions.	  
As	   well	   as	   offering	   obvious	   flexibility	   for	  Member	   States	   in	   pursuing	   their	   objectives	   of	   value	   for	  
money	   in	   the	   commercial	   aspects	   of	   procurement,	   as	   we	   have	   just	   discussed	   above,	   the	   utilities	  
regime	  may	  also	  provides	  greater	  opportunities	   for	  promoting	  social	  and	  environmental	  objectives	  
in	  procurement.	  However,	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  current	  Public	  Sector	  and	  Utilities	  Directives	  
in	  this	  respect	  are	  rather	  unclear31,	  and	  this	  is	  one	  area	  in	  which	  adjustment,	  or	  at	  least	  clarification,	  
of	  the	  rules	  may	  be	  appropriate	  under	  any	  new	  directive.	  This	  issue	  is	  considered	  further	  in	  section	  
4.4	  below.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  B.	  Heuninckx,	  “The	  EU	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Procurement	  Directive:	  Trick	  or	  Treat?”	  (2010)	  19	  Public	  
Procurement	  Law	  Review	  9.	  
30	  Although	  factual	  issues	  concerning	  suitability	  can	  be	  verified	  later.	  
31	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  see	  Arrowsmith	  and	  Maund,	  note	  23	  above.	  
4.	  Simplicity	  
In	  addition	  to	  providing	  greater	  flexibility	  for	  Member	  States,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  moving	  to	  a	  single	  
directive	   based	   on	   the	   current	   Utilities	   Directive	   would	   at	   the	   same	   time	   introduce	   a	   very	  
considerable	  degree	  of	  simplification	  of	  the	  current	  procurement	  regime,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  making	  the	  
rules	   easier	   to	   understand	   operate	   (both	   for	   procuring	   entities	   and	   for	   economic	   operators)	   and	  
reducing	  uncertainty.	  	  Such	  simplification	  will	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  operating	  the	  rules	  and	  the	  costs	  
of	   litigation,	   and	   allow	   procuring	   entities	   to	   devote	   energy	   and	   resources	   on	   obtaining	   value	   for	  
money	  rather	  than	  to	  formal	  legal	  compliance.	  	  
Simplification	  will	  arise,	   first,	   from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Utilities	  Directive	  are	   less	  complex	  
and	  detailed	  than	  those	  of	  the	  Public	  Sector	  Directive.	  For	  example,	  as	  we	  have	  noted	  above,	  there	  
are	  no	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  satisfied	  for	  using	  the	  different	  competitive	  award	  procedures	  (only	  
for	   use	  of	   the	  negotiated	  procedure	  without	   a	   notice),	   and	  no	   closed	   list	   of	   evidence	   that	   can	  be	  
demanded	  from	  economic	  operators.	  Further,	  the	  free	  availability	  of	  the	  negotiated	  procedure	  with	  
a	  notice	  provides	   for	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  an	  award	  procedure	  which,	  being	  very	   flexible,	   is	  also	  
relatively	   simple,	   if	  Member	   States	  or	   (where	  permitted	   to	   choose	   the	  procedure)	   their	   procuring	  
entities,	  prefer	  this.	  Thus	  the	  flexibility	  that	  appears	  to	  exist,	  for	  example,	  in	  holding	  discussions	  with	  
suppliers	  after	  submission	  of	  offers,	  means	  that	  there	  is	  much	  less	  room	  for	  dispute	  over	  issues	  such	  
as	   post-­‐tender	   negotiations,	   or	   corrections	   to	   errors	   in	   tenders,	   than	   exists	   in	   other	   award	  
procedures.	   It	   is	   notable	   that	   there	   have	   been	   very	   few	   proceedings	   in	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
concerning	  the	  procedural	  rules	  of	  the	  negotiated	  procedure	  with	  a	  competition	  under	  the	  Utilities	  
Directive,	   which	   may	   be	   because	   of	   the	   simplicity	   and	   clarity	   of	   the	   rules	   (although	   it	   is	  
acknowledged	  there	  could	  also	  be	  other	  reasons	  to	  explain	  this).	  
Secondly,	   simplicity	  will	  be	  greatly	  enhanced	   if	   the	  above	  proposal	   is	   accepted	  by	   the	  very	   fact	  of	  
having	  one	  single	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  different	  award	  procedures.	  	  
This	  will	  of	  itself	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  understand	  and	  operate	  the	  procurement	  rules.	  This	  is	  important	  
particularly	   in	   the	   not	   uncommon	   case	   of	   procuring	   entities,	   economic	   operators,	   and	   advisors	  
entities	   whose	   activities	   are	   subject	   to	   more	   than	   one	   of	   the	   three	   -­‐	   and	   potentially,	   with	   the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  new	  regime	  on	  concessions,	  four	  -­‐	  procurement	  regimes.	  	  
In	  addition,	  simplicity	  will	  be	  further	  enhanced	  in	  this	  respect	  by	  removing	  some	  legal	  uncertainties	  
and	   confusion	   over	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   provisions	   governing	   the	   different	   regimes.	   The	  
rules	   under	   the	   different	   regimes	   currently	   do	   not	   always	   fit	   together	   in	   a	   coherent	   and	   logical	  
manner.	  	  
An	   example	   is	   the	   treatment	   of	   competitive	   dialogue.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   in	   2004	   this	   award	  
procedure	  was	   added	   to	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive	   as	   a	   procedure	   available	   (like	   the	   negotiated	  
procedures)	  on	  limited	  grounds,	  for	  the	  award	  of	  particularly	  complex	  contracts.	  It	  was	  not	  included	  
in	  the	  Utilities	  Directive:	  this	  was	  considered	  unnecessary	  since	  the	  negotiated	  procedure	   is	  a	  very	  
flexible	   procedure	   capable	   of	   accommodating	   the	   type	   of	   procedure	   provided	   by	   competitive	  
dialogue,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  procedural	  variations,	  and	  since	  it	  is	  freely	  available	  the	  Utilities	  Directive	  
already	  provided	  Member	  States	  with	  the	  possibility	  for	  using	  the	  “competitive	  dialogue”	  approach.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  competitive	  dialogue	  has	  been	  made	  available	  under	  the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  
Directive	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  directive,	  like	  the	  Utilities	  Directive,	  allows	  procuring	  entities	  free	  
use	  of	  the	  negotiated	  procedure32.	  However,	  competitive	  dialogue	  is	  not	  freely	  available	  under	  the	  
Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive,	  but	  may	  be	  used	  only	   for	  particularly	   complex	  contracts,	  as	  under	  
the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive.33	   The	   explanation	   given	   in	   recital	   48	   of	   the	   Defence	   and	   Security	  
Directive	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  competitive	  dialogue	  is	  that	  use	  of	  either	  the	  negotiated	  procedure	  or	  
the	  restricted	  procedure	  is	  not	  feasible	  in	  certain	  cases	  where	  competitive	  dialogue	  applies	  because	  
it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  define	  the	  contract	  with	  enough	  precision	  to	  allow	  candidates	  to	  draw	  up	  their	  
offers.	   This	   is	   highly	   questionable	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   negotiated	   procedure	   since	   the	   negotiations	  
allowed	  by	  that	  procedure	  can	  be	  used	  to	  that	  end,	   if	  necessary	  –	   including	  by	  following	  the	  same	  
kind	   of	   approach	   as	   with	   competitive	   dialogue	   within	   the	   rules	   of	   a	   negotiated	   procedure	   -­‐	   and	  
inconsistent	   with	   the	   omission	   of	   competitive	   dialogue	   from	   the	   Utilities	   Directive34.	   Further,	   the	  
reasoning	   in	   recital	   48	   of	   the	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Directive	  would,	   if	   correct,	   imply	   that	   certain	  
complex	  contracts	  cannot	  be	  awarded	  at	  all	  under	  the	  Utilities	  Directive	  because	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
feasible	   award	   procedure	   (restricted,	   open	   (by	   implication)	   and	   negotiated	   procedures	   all	   being	  
categorised	   by	   the	   recital	   as	   unsuitable).	   This	   kind	   of	   confusion	   can	   be	   eliminated	   at	   a	   stroke	   by	  
providing	  for	  a	  single	  set	  of	  procedural	  rules	  for	  all	  regulated	  procurement.	  
Another	  example	  of	  inconsistency	  and	  potential	  for	  confusion	  is	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Defence	  
and	  Security	  Directive	   contains	  many	   specific	   references	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	   taking	   confidentiality	  
and	  security	  issues	  into	  account	  that	  are	  not	  found	  in	  the	  equivalent	  provisions	  of	  the	  Public	  Sector	  
Directive	  or	  Utilities	  Directive35,	  even	  though	  confidentiality	  in	  contract	  performance	  (for	  example,	  in	  
handling	  of	  the	  data	  of	  medical	  patients)	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  those	  directives.	  For	  
example,	  Article	  22	  of	  the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive	  states	  that	  the	  contracting	  authority	  is	  to	  
specify	   in	   the	   contract	   documentation	   the	   measures	   and	   requirements	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	  
security	   of	   classified	   contract	   information,	   and	   also	   states	   various	   contract	   conditions	   that	   the	  
procuring	   entity	   may	   require	   tenderers	   and	   their	   subcontractors	   to	   meet	   to	   protect	   classified	  
information36.	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   confidentiality	   and	   security	   concerns	   should	   not	   be	   permitted	  
under	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive	   under	   its	   general	   provisions.	   The	   better	   view	   is	   that	   they	   are	  
permitted	  to	  at	  least	  the	  same	  extent	  at	  all	  stages	  in	  the	  process37	  -­‐	  but	  in	  that	  case	  it	  would	  be	  more	  
logical	  for	  the	  directives	  all	  to	  be	  worded	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  these	  respects.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Defence	  
and	  Security	  Directive	  includes	  certain	  clear	  restrictions	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  certain	  security-­‐related	  
matters	   should	  be	  dealt	  with,	   notably	   by	   defining	  what	  may	  be	   required	  with	   respect	   to	   proof	   of	  
security	   of	   supply38,	   that	   have	   no	   parallels	   in	   the	   other	   directives.	   Again,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   this	  
matter	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  expressly	  only	  in	  that	  Directive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive,	  Art.25.	  
33	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive,	  Art.27	  and	  also	  Art.	  1(21)	  defining	  particularly	  complex	  contract.	  
34	  As	  well	  as	  with	  the	  approach	  sometimes	  adopted	  in	  practice	  to	  awarding	  contracts	  under	  the	  negotiated	  
procedure:	  see	  section	  2.2	  below.	  
35	  For	  a	  full	  account	  see	  Heuninckx,	  note	  29	  above.	  	  
36	  See	  also,	  for	  example,	  Article	  45(2)	  of	  the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive	  which	  in	  permitting	  exclusion	  for	  
criminal	  convictions	  related	  to	  the	  economic	  operator’s	  trade	  or	  profession	  refers	  expressly	  to	  infringement	  of	  
existing	  legislation	  on	  the	  export	  of	  defence	  and/or	  security	  equipment,	  an	  explicit	  reference	  that	  is	  absent	  
from	  the	  corresponding	  provision	  in	  Art.45(2)(c)	  of	  the	  Public	  Sector	  Directive.	  
37	  See	  also	  Heuninckx,	  note	  29	  above.	  In	  Case	  C-­‐324/93,	  The	  Queen	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Home	  Department,	  
ex	  parte	  Evans	  Medical	  Ltd	  and	  Macfarlan	  Smith	  Ltd	  ()	  [1995]	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐563,	  paras.44-­‐45,	  indicated	  that	  ability	  to	  
ensure	  security	  of	  the	  supplies	  delivered	  may	  be	  a	  contract	  award	  criterion,	  for	  example.	  
38	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive	  Article	  43.	  
Another	   significant	  way	   in	  which	   a	   single	   directive	   could	   potentially	   enhance	   the	   simplicity	   of	   the	  
procurement	   regime	   is	   by	   eliminating	   or	   reducing	   the	   complex	   rules	   that	   set	   the	   boundaries	  
between	   them.	   This	   would	   be	   the	   case,	   in	   particular,	   if	   a	   single	   uniform	   regime	   were	   to	   be	  
established	  for	  procurement	  covered	  by	  all	   three	  directives,	   including	  uniformity	   in	  the	  exclusions,	  
the	  entities	  covered,	   the	  activities	  covered,	  and	  the	  thresholds	   for	  application	  of	   the	  directives.	  As	  
regards	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive	  and	  the	  Public	  Sector	  Directive	  there	  is,	  it	  
is	  submitted,	  very	  clearly	  no	  reason	  for	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  any	  of	  these	  matters,	  and	  the	  rules	  
can	   be	   assimilated	   very	   easily.	   (The	   fact	   that	   some	   of	   the	   exemptions	  may	   never	   or	   rarely	   apply	  
outside	   the	   field	   of	   defence	   and	   security	   procurement	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   or	  
desirable	  to	  confine	  them	  	  formally	  to	  that	  sphere	  only	  –	  if	  the	  substantive	  conditions	  for	  their	  use	  
are	  met	  then	  they	  should	  be	  available	  regardless	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  procurement).	  With	  regard	  to	  
the	  Utilities	  Directive	  and	  the	  other	  two	  directives	  there	  is,	  again,	  no	  justification	  for	  the	  differences	  
that	   currently	   apply	   between	   the	   three	   different	   directives	   as	   regards	   exclusions.	   However,	   in	  
respect	   of	   other	   matters	   would	   need	   careful	   consideration,	   as	   there	   is	   room	   for	   debate	   over	  
whether	  full	  uniformity	  of	  the	  coverage	  rules	  is	  feasible	  and	  desirable.	  
One	  first	  question	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  scope	  of	  procuring	  entities	  covered	  by	  the	  directives	  should	  
be	   assimilated.	   In	   this	   respect,	   both	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive	   and	   Utilities	   Directive	   cover	  
contracting	   authorities39,	   but	   the	   Utilities	   Directive	   covers,	   in	   addition,	   “public	   undertakings”	   and	  
entities	  (including	  private	  entities)	  that	  have	  special	  or	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  carry	  out	  one	  of	  the	  utility	  
activities	   regulated	   by	   the	   directive40.	   (The	   Defence	   and	   Security	   Directive	   applies	   to	   contracts	  
covered	  by	  either	  directive	  that	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  subject	  matter	  covered	  by	  the	  Defence	  and	  
Security	  Directive).	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  category	  “public	  undertakings”	  under	  the	  Utilities	  Directive	  
has	  been	  reduced41	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  “contracting	  authority”	  has	  been	  interpreted	  broadly	  to	  include	  
entities	   that	   supply	   goods	   or	   services	   to	   a	   market	   except	   where	   these	   operate	   on	   a	   wholly	  
commercial	   basis42	   combined	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   entities	   that	   carry	   out	   utility	   activities	   on	   a	  
commercial	  basis	  are	  largely	  exempt	  anyway	  from	  the	  directives43.	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  
directives	   thus	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Utilities	   Directive	   covers	   certain	   private	   entities	   that	   have	  
special	   or	   exclusive	   rights.	   The	   case	   for	   regulating	   these	   entities	   at	   all	   is	   limited	   and	   they	   are	   not	  
generally	   regulated	   under	   other	   trade	   agreements	   on	   procurement,	   including	   the	   World	   Trade	  
Organization’s	   Government	   Procurement	   Agreement.	   Although	   does	   not	   form	   part	   of	   the	  
Commission’s	   2011	  proposals,	   an	   argument	   can	   thus	   be	  made	   that	   a	   new	  directive	   should	   simply	  
limit	   regulation	   to	   bodies	   that	   are	   contracting	   authorities	   within	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   current	  
directives.	   If	   that	   step	  were	   taken	   there	  would	   then	   (subject	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   thresholds	   discussed	  
below)	  be	  no	  need	  for	  any	  definition	  of	  what	  are	  covered	  “utility”	  activities	  –	  contracting	  authorities	  
would	  in	  principle	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  single	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  all	  their	  activities,	  whilst	  other	  entities	  would	  
not	  be	  regulated.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Public	  Sector	  Directive	  Article	  1(9),	  Utilities	  Directive	  Article	  2.	  
40	  Utilities	  Directive	  Article	  2.	  
41	  Although	  not	  necessarily	  eliminated,	  since	  it	  covers,	  for	  example,	  entities	  subject	  to	  a	  dominant	  influence	  of	  
a	  contracting	  authority	  which	  might	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  type	  of	  influence	  necessary	  (in	  terms	  of	  financing,	  
management	  supervision	  or	  appointment)	  for	  the	  entity	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  body	  governed	  by	  public	  law	  and	  
hence	  as	  a	  contracting	  authority.	  However,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  category	  is	  likely	  now	  to	  be	  at	  best	  insignificant	  
and	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  directive	  of	  questionable	  value.	  	  
42	  On	  this	  see	  Arrowsmith	  (ed.),	  note	  21	  above,	  section	  4.1.2.3.	  
43	  See	  Arrowsmith,	  The	  Law	  of	  Public	  and	  Utilities	  Procurement,	  note	  13	  above,	  chapter	  15.	  
Another	  difference	  between	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  current	  directives	  that	  would	  need	  consideration,	  
however,	   is	   the	  difference	  between	   the	   financial	   thresholds	   for	   their	   application.	   For	   supplies	  and	  
services	  contracts	   these	  are	  much	   lower	  under	   the	  Public	  Sector	  Directive	   than	  under	   the	  Utilities	  
Directive	  and	   the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Directive.	  Although	  some	  suggestions	  have	  been	  made	   for	  
raising	   the	   thresholds	   under	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive	   in	   line	   with	   the	   other	   directives,	   this	   is	  
probably	   impractical	   in	   the	   short	   to	  medium	   term	   given	   that	   the	   thresholds	   in	   the	   Public	   Sector	  
Directive	  have	  been	  set	  in	  line	  with	  those	  of	  the	  WTO’s	  Government	  Procurement	  Agreement,	  which	  
guarantees	   access	   to	   certain	   procurements	   within	   the	   EU	   to	   some	   of	   the	   EU’s	   trading	   partners,	  
under	  reciprocal	  arrangements44;	  and	  it,	  also,	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  current	  proposals.	  
The	   difficulty	   of	   any	   upward	   adjustment	   to	   these	   thresholds	   is	   increased	   by	   the	   agreement	   on	  
revision	  to	  the	  GPA	  –	  including	  the	  reciprocal	  coverage	  of	  the	  Parties	  -­‐	  which	  was	  concluded	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  201145.	  Harmonising	   the	   thresholds	   for	   the	  Public	   Sector	  Directive	  and	   the	  other	  directives	  
would	  thus	  effectively	  mean	  reducing	  the	  thresholds	  for	  the	  other	  directives.	  Such	  a	  change	  would	  
be	  a	  retrograde	  step	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  flexibility.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  entity	  coverage	  of	  
the	  Utilities	  Directive	  were	  changed	  so	  that	  only	  contracting	  authorities	  were	  covered,	  lowering	  the	  
thresholds	  for	  utility	  activities	  would	  be	  quite	  a	  limited	  step.	  Assuming	  that	  that	  step	  is	  also	  taken,	  it	  
is	   submitted	   that,	   on	   balance,	   the	   simplicity	   that	   would	   result	   from	   such	   a	   change	   –	   effectively	  
precluding	   the	   need	   for	   any	   rules	   to	   demarcate	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   “utilities”	   and	   “other”	  
procurement	  rules	  in	  terms	  of	  defining	  utility	  activities	  and	  dealing	  with	  contracts	  for	  more	  than	  one	  
activity	  –	  would	  probably	  justify	  lowering	  the	  thresholds	  for	  the	  relevant	  contracts.	  Applying	  a	  single,	  
simple	  threshold	  for	  defence	  and	  security	  procurement	  might	  similarly	  be	   justified	  by	  concerns	  for	  
simplicity.	   If,	  however,	   it	   is	  preferred	   to	  maintain	  a	  higher	   threshold	   for	  procurement	  of	   this	  kind,	  
the	  most	  simple	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  define	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  lower	  threshold	  solely	  by	  reference	  
to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  relevant	  GPA	  exclusions.	  	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  author’s	  view	  the	  same	  thresholds	  should	  be	  applied	  also	  to	  concession	  contracts	  as	  to	  other	  
types	  of	  regulated	  contracts.	  
	  
5.	  Adjustments	  to	  the	  regime	  of	  the	  Utilities	  Directive	  	  
We	  have	   so	   far	   suggested	   that	   the	  way	   forward	   for	   reform	   is	   to	   apply	   a	   single	   set	  of	   rules	   to	   the	  
procurement	   of	   contracting	   authorities	   based	   in	   principle	   on	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   current	   Utilities	  
Directive.	   For	   the	  most	   part	   these	   rules	   provide	   a	   suitable	   regulatory	   framework	   as	   they	   stand	   at	  
present.	   However,	   there	   are	   some	   aspects	   of	   these	   rules	   in	   which	   small	   changes	   or,	   at	   least,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  See	  S.Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law International; 2003), and for recent 
developments, S. Arrowsmith and R. D. Anderson (ed.), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: 
Challenge and Reform (CUP; 2011) passim. Where	  utilities	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  GPA	  the	  higher	  thresholds	  of	  
the	  Utilities	  Directive	  are	  reflected	  in	  that	  agreement.	  The	  higher	  thresholds	  for	  the	  Defence	  and	  Security	  
Directive	  are	  based	  on	  the	  view	  that	  the	  GPA	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  such	  procurement	  (see	  recital	  18	  to	  that	  
Directive).	  For	  the	  relevant	  GPA	  exclusions	  see	  GPA	  Article	  XXIII.1	  and	  relevant	  exclusions	  in	  the	  EU’s	  Annexes	  
which	  exclude	  the	  procurement	  of	  Defence	  Ministries	  apart	  from	  purchase	  specified	  in	  a	  particular	  list,	  which	  
does	  not	  include	  products	  of	  an	  exclusively	  military	  nature	  nor	  certain	  dual	  use	  products.	  
45	  On	  this	  see	  R.	  D.	  Anderson,	  “The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  WTO	  Agreement	  on	  Government	  
Procurement	  in	  December	  2011:	  	  what	  it	  means	  for	  the	  Agreement	  and	  for	  the	  world	  economy”	  (2012)	  21	  
P.P.L.R.	  83.	  
	  
clarifications	  may	  be	  desirable	  as	  part	  of	   the	  reform	  process.	  The	  most	  significant	  are	  summarised	  
briefly	  as	   follows.	   Some	  of	   these	   issues	  are,	   in	   fact,	   addressed	   in	   the	  Commission’s	  proposals,	  but	  
others	  are	  addressed	  inadequately	  or	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  not	  clear,	  as	  is	  elaborated	  below.	  It	  can	  be	  
noted	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  current	  proposals	  for	  a	  new	  directive	  on	  utilities	  also	  contain	  a	  range	  of	  
other	   reforms	   paralleling	   reforms	   for	   the	   public	   sector	   which,	   in	   the	   author’s	   view,	   will	   increase	  
burdens	  on	  purchasers	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  regime	  with	   little	  or	  no	  benefit	  and	  thus	  are	  not	  
desirable46.	   Detailed	   consideration	   of	   these	   specific	   proposals	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   article,	  
which	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  author’s	  own	  proposals	  for	  reform.	  
First,	  and	  most	   significantly,	   the	   rules	  on	   framework	  agreements	  and	  dynamic	  purchasing	   systems	  
need	  reconsideration.	  The	  rules	  on	  framework	  agreements	  in	  the	  utilities	  sector	  currently	  lack	  clarity	  
and	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   they	   provide	   an	   adequate	   legal	   regime	   for	   controlling	   the	   use	   of	  
frameworks	   by	   utilities47.	   This	   is	   particularly	   the	   case	   given	   that	   the	   placing	   of	   call-­‐offs	   under	  
framework	  agreements	  under	   the	  utilities	   rules	  appears	   to	  be	  wholly	  or	   largely	  excluded	   from	  the	  
system	  of	   supplier	   remedies.	   This	  may	   be	   one	   area	   in	  which	   it	   is	   desirable	   to	   reduce	   rather	   than	  
increase	   flexibility,	   perhaps	   by	   applying	   a	   similar	   regime	   to	   that	   of	   the	   current	   Public	   Sector	  
Directive.	  This	   is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  current	  proposals48.	  As	  regards	  
the	  dynamic	  purchasing	  system	  concept,	  this	  has	  –	  as	  predicted	  by	  the	  present	  author	  when	  it	  was	  
adopted49	   –	   hardly	   been	   used50,	   and	   needs	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   a	   truly	   dynamic	   system	   that	   allows	  
procuring	  entities	   to	  purchase	   from	  electronic	  systems	  without	   the	  need	  for	  a	  new	  notice	  and	  call	  
for	   tender	   for	   every	   call-­‐off,	   based	   on	   offers	   that	   appear	   at	   the	   time	   of	   call-­‐off	   on	   the	   electronic	  
system.	  Neither	  the	  proposed	  revisions	  to	  the	  dynamic	  purchasing	  system	  system	  concept	  under	  the	  
proposals	  for	  a	  new	  directive51,	  nor	  proposed	  new	  rules	  on	  electronic	  catalogues52,	  provided	  for	  this.	  
Secondly,	   the	   rules	   currently	   provide	   that	   a	   notice	   of	   a	   qualification	   system	   can	   be	   used	   as	   the	  
means	  to	  advertise	  a	  contract	   instead	  of	  a	  contract	  notice	  or	  periodic	   indicative	  notice	  only	  where	  
the	   potential	   bidders	   are	   all	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   qualification	   system.53	   There	   is	   no	   apparent	  
justification	  for	  this:	  it	  simply	  results	  in	  less	  competition	  than	  might	  otherwise	  be	  available	  (although	  
in	  practice	  a	  procuring	  entity	  can	  encourage	  non-­‐registered	  providers	  that	  it	  would	  like	  to	  invite	  to	  
register	   on	   the	   system	   before	   it	   commences	   the	   procedure).	   It	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   remove	   this	  
restriction.	  
	  
Thirdly,	  as	  the	  author	  has	  argued	  elsewhere,	  the	  rules	  on	  the	  conduct	  of	  electronic	  auctions	  in	  the	  
Utilities	   Directive	   arguably	   need	   amending	   to	   allow	   negotiation	   of	   tenders	   after	   an	   auction	  
procedure	  when	  the	  negotiated	  procedure	  is	  used:	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  this	  possibility	  should	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  E.g	  those	  referred	  to	  in	  note	  11	  above.	  
47	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Arrowsmith,	  note	  14	  above,	  pp.1062-­‐1071.	  
48	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  procurement	  by	  entities	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  postal	  services	  
sectors,	  note	  6	  above,	  Article	  45.	  
49	  Arrowsmith,	  note	  14	  above,	  p.1209.	  
50	  See	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  “Methods	  for	  purchasing	  on-­‐going	  requirements:	  the	  system	  of	  framework	  agreements	  
and	  dynamic	  purchasing	  systems	  under	  the	  EC	  Directives	  and	  UK	  procurement	  regulations”,	  ch.3	  in	  S.	  
Arrowsmith	  (ed),	  Public	  Procurement	  Regulation	  in	  the	  21st	  Century:	  Reform	  of	  the	  UNCITRAL	  Model	  Law	  on	  
Procurement	  (West,	  2010/11).	  
51	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  procurement	  by	  entities	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  postal	  services	  
sectors,	  note	  6	  above,	  Article	  46.	  
52	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  procurement	  by	  entities	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  postal	  services	  
sectors,	  note	  6	  above,	  Article	  48.	  
53	  Utilities	  Directive	  Article	  54(9).	  	  
allowed	   in	   negotiated	   procedures	   in	   general,	   but	   not	   when	   an	   auction	   is	   held	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
negotiated	  procedure54.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  possibility	   is	  not	  allowed	  at	  present	  following	  an	  auction	  
phase	  in	  negotiated	  procedures	  has	  resulted	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  text	  of	  the	  auction	  rules	  was	  drafted	  
in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  Public	   Sector	  Directive	   and	   simply	   copied	   into	   the	  Utilities	  Directive	  without	  
considering	  how	  the	  rules	   tie	   in	  with	   the	  other	   rules	  of	   the	   latter	  Directive.	   	   In	  practice,	  procuring	  
entities	  will	   not	   generally	  wish	   to	  negotiate	   tenders	   after	   an	   auction,	   since	   auctions	  will	   generally	  
prove	  more	   effective	   as	   tool	   for	   securing	   value	   for	  money	   without	   the	   possibility	   of	   negotiation.	  
However,	   there	   are	   exceptional	   cases	   in	   which	   this	   may	   be	   useful,	   notably	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
collaborative	  auctions,	  which	  research	  suggests	  are	  made	  more	  difficult	  if	  post-­‐auction	  negotiations	  
are	  prohibited55.	  	  
Another	   specific	   issue	   that	  needs	   some	  attention	   is	   the	   relationship	  between	   selection	  and	  award	  
criteria.	  Specifically	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  address	  the	  interpretation	  that	  has	  sometimes	  been	  put	  on	  the	  
case	  of	  Lianakis	  that	  matters	  considered	  at	  selection	  stage	  can	  never	  be	  considered	  when	  applying	  
the	  award	  criteria.	  It	  is	  not	  proposed	  to	  revisit	  this	  here	  this	  extensively	  debated	  issue56,	  other	  than	  
to	   note	   the	   author’s	   view57	   that	   any	  matter	   should	   be	   able	   to	   be	   considered	   at	   the	   award	   stage	  
provided	  that	  is	  related	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  offer,	  and	  that	  this	  can	  potentially	  include	  experience	  of	  
tenderers’	   personnel	  or	  of	   the	   tenderer	   itself.	   Both	  may	   be	   crucial	   in	   assessing,	   in	   particular,	   the	  
quality	   of	   professional	   services	   that	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   provided	   as	   compared	   with	   that	   of	   other	  
tenderers.	  In	  the	  author’s	  view,	  that	  this	  is	  possible	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  current	  
directives	  and	  is	  not	  precluded	  by	  Lianakis	  and	  subsequent	  CJEU	  case	  law,	  which	  concerned	  cases	  in	  
which	   the	   assessment	   was	   not	   on	   the	   facts	   directed	   at	   assessing	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   offer	   at	   all.	  
However,	   because	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   confusion	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   issue,	   some	   clarification	  
along	   these	   lines	   is	   essential,	   either	   in	   the	   text	   or	   recitals	   of	   the	   new	   single	   directive,	   or	   in	   clear	  
accompanying	  guidance.	  The	  Commission’s	  proposals	  contain	  provisions	  to	  address	  this	  issue58,	  but	  
do	  so	  only	  to	  allow	  consideration	  of	  the	  quality	  and	  experience	  of	  staff,	  and	  of	  the	  firm	   itself;	  and	  
only	  for	  services	  and	  contracts	  involving	  design	  of	  works	  contracts	  (which	  will	  create	  difficulties	  for,	  
in	  particular,	  certain	  mixed	  contracts	  that	  include	  works	  or	  services).	  
Finally,	   there	   is	   some	   uncertainty	   over	   the	   possibility	   for	   promoting	   horizontal	   policies	   through	  
procurement59,	   and	   clarification,	   and	   possibly	   reform,	   of	   these	   rules	   is	   needed.	   It	   is	   beyond	   the	  
scope	  of	   this	   chapter	   to	   consider	   this	   issue	   in	   any	   detail,	   and	  we	  will	   not	   here	   consider	   the	  most	  
controversial	  issues	  such	  as	  whether	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  remove	  the	  restrictions	  that	  currently	  exist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Arrowsmith,	  note	  14	  above,	  pp.1186-­‐1188	  and	  1205-­‐1206.	  
55	  See	  	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  and	  A.	  Eyo,	  “Electronic	  Auctions	  in	  the	  EC	  Procurement	  Directives	  and	  a	  Perspective	  from	  
UK	  Law	  and	  Practice”,	  chapter	  12	  in	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  (ed),	  Public	  Procurement	  Regulation	  in	  the	  21st	  Century:	  
Reform	  of	  the	  UNCITRAL	  Model	  Law	  on	  Procurement	  (West,	  2010/11).	  
56	  See,	  in	  particular,	  Arrowsmith	  (ed.),	  note	  21	  above,	  at	  6.7.2.6;	  P.	  Lee,	  “Implications	  of	  the	  Lianakis	  decision”,	  
2010	  (2)	  Public	  Procurement	  Law	  Review	  47;	  S.	  Treumer,	  “The	  Distinction	  between	  Selection	  and	  Award	  
Criteria	  in	  EC	  Public	  Procurement	  Law:	  A	  Rule	  without	  Exception?”	  (2009)	  18	  Public	  Procurement	  Law	  Review	  
103.	  
57	  Arrowsmith	  (ed.),	  note	  21	  above,	  at	  6.7.2.6.	  
58	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  procurement	  by	  entities	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  postal	  services	  
sectors,	  note	  6	  above,	  Article	  76.	  
59	  On	  the	  rules	  in	  the	  utilities	  sector	  specifically	  see	  Arrowsmith	  and	  Maund,	  note	  23,	  above.	  The	  points	  made	  
here	  are	  relevant	  for	  all	  the	  current	  directives,	  however.	  
on	   horizontal	   policies	   going	   beyond	   the	   way	   that	   the	   contracts	   is	   performed60	   (for	   example,	  
requirements	  that	  a	  supplier’s	  business	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  meet	  particular	  ethical	  or	  environmental	  
standards,	   or	   limiting	   access	   to	   certain	   types	   of	   business,	   such	   as	   Small	   and	   Medium-­‐sized	  
Enterprises).	   However,	   there	   are	   three	   points	   that	   certainly	   need	   clarification	   to	   bring	   coherence	  
into	  the	  current	  rules	  and	  remove	  uncertainty.	  	  
	   One	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  award	  criteria,	  contract	  conditions	  or	  other	  mechanisms	  for	  
implementing	   horizontal	   policies	   can	   cover	   methods	   of	   production	   of	   supplies.	   There	   is	   some	  
confusion	  on	  this	  point,	  since	  the	  European	  Commission	  suggests	  in	  its	  formal	  guidance	  that	  to	  do	  so	  
is	  unlawful	  as	  a	  general	  principle61.	  However,	  it	  also	  gives	  as	  examples	  of	  permitted	  criteria	  measures	  
that	  appear	  to	  concern	  production,	  notably	  criteria	  relating	  to	  “green”	  energy	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  
using	  such	  measures	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  case	  law62.	  It	  needs	  clarifying	  that	  such	  measures	  are	  
permitted	   in	   principle.	   Not	   least	   this	   is	   because	   to	   rule	   them	   out	   precludes	   any	   environmental	  
policies	  that	  take	  account	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  whole	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  a	  product	  and	  require	  procuring	  
entities	   to	   focus	   on	   only	   some	   elements	   of	   environmental	   impact	   –	   an	   approach	   that	   is	   not	   only	  
arbitrary	   but	   could	   be	   counter-­‐productive	   when	   there	   are	   significant	   impacts	   at	   the	   production	  
stage.	   The	   2011	   proposals	   of	   the	   Commission	   in	   fact	   provide	   for	   this,	   by	   expressly	   allowing	  
consideration	  of	  environmental	  costs	  of	  production63.	  	  
Secondly,	   whilst	   contract	   conditions	   may	   clearly	   cover	   matters	   related	   to	   the	   workforce	   on	   the	  
contract	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  requiring	  employment	  on	  the	  contract	  of	  long-­‐term	  unemployed	  persons	  
or	  those	  with	  disabilities	  -­‐	  the	  Commission	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  use	  award	  criteria	  
relating	  to	  these	  matters,	  except	  where	  tenders	  are	  otherwise	  equal64.	  Again,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  this	  
is	  incorrect	  in	  light	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  CJEU65	  and	  it	  is	  also	  unjustified	  given	  that	  award	  criteria	  can	  
offer	   a	  more	   efficient	  method	  of	   policy	   implementation	   in	   some	   cases	   than	   contract	   conditions66.	  
There	  is	  need	  for	  clarification	  of	  the	  rules	  to	  this	  effect.	  	  
Finally,	   it	   is	   widely	   considered	   that	   –	   at	   least	   under	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Directive67	   -­‐	   economic	  
operators	   cannot	  be	  excluded	   from	  a	   contract	  because	  of	   inability	   to	  perform	  contract	   conditions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  these	  and	  other	  policies	  see	  generally	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  “Horizontal	  Policies	  in	  
Public	  Procurement:	  a	  Taxonomy”	  (2010)	  10	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Procurement	  149,	  and	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
distinction	  in	  EU	  procurement	  law	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  “Application	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  and	  Directives	  to	  Horizontal	  
Policies:	  a	  Critical	  Review”,	  ch.4	  in	  Arrowsmith	  and	  Kunzlik	  (eds),	  note	  23	  above.	  
61	  European	  Commission,	  Interpretative	  Communication	  on	  the	  Community	  law	  applicable	  to	  public	  
procurement	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  integrating	  social	  considerations	  into	  public	  procurement	  COM(2001)566	  
final,	  p.10.	  
62	  For	  discussion	  see,	  in	  particular,	  P.	  Kunzlik,	  “The	  Procurement	  of	  “Green”	  Energy”,	  ch.9	  in	  S.	  Arrowsmith	  and	  
P.	  Kunzlik	  (eds),	  note	  23	  above.	  	  
63	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  procurement	  by	  entities	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  postal	  services	  
sectors,	  note	  6	  above,	  Article	  77(1)(a).	  
64	  European	  Commission,	  Interpretative	  Communication	  on	  the	  Community	  law	  applicable	  to	  public	  
procurement	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  integrating	  social	  considerations	  into	  public	  procurement	  COM(2001)566	  
final,	  pp.14-­‐15.	  
65	  Case	  C-­‐225/98,	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐7445	  (Nord	  Pas	  de	  Calais),	  which	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  
Communication,	  above,	  interprets	  as	  allowing	  such	  considerations	  as	  award	  criteria	  only	  where	  other	  aspects	  
of	  tenders	  are	  equal.	  However,	  this	  was	  not	  mentioned	  by	  the	  Court;	  nor	  is	  it	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  such	  a	  limit	  
could	  be	  read	  into	  the	  directives.	  
66	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  different	  approaches	  see	  Arrowsmith,	  note	  60	  above.	  
67	  On	  whether	  this	  is	  also	  applicable	  for	  the	  utilities	  rules	  see	  Arrowsmith	  and	  Maund,	  note	  23	  above.	  
relating	  to	  workforce	  matters,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  former	  do	  not	  concern	  “technical”	  capability68.	  
This	   is	   unjustified	   since	   it	   places	   horizontal	   concerns	   on	   a	   lower	   level	   than	   commercial	   concerns	  
without	  any	  good	  reason	  for	  doing	  so.	  Further,	   the	  distinction	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  contract	  
conditions	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  determining	  technical	  capacity	  creates	  uncertainty	  since	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  
into	  which	  category	  (technical	  or	  non-­‐technical)	  some	  conditions,	  such	  as	  those	  relating	  to	  delivery	  
and	  disposal	  of	  a	  product,	  fall.	  This	  matter	  also	  needs	  addressing.	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
This	   article	   has	   set	   out	   a	   simple	   proposal	   for	   reforming	   the	   EU	   procurement	   directives	   as	   an	  
alternative	  to	  the	  approach	  currently	  proposed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  has	  
been	  suggested	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  regulate	  procurement	  through	  a	  single	  directive	  that	  sets	  out	  a	  
single	  set	  of	  procedural	   constraints	   for	  all	   regulated	  procurement.	  This	  directive	  should	   take	  as	   its	  
starting	  point	   the	  procedural	   rules	   currently	   found	   in	   the	  Utilities	  Directive	  although	  perhaps	  with	  
some	   modifications,	   in	   particular	   as	   regards	   the	   rules	   on	   framework	   agreements,	   dynamic	  
purchasing	   systems,	   and	  electronic	   auctions.	   Such	  an	  approach	  will	   afford	   the	   flexibility	  necessary	  
for	   Member	   State	   to	   promote	   their	   own	   procurement	   policies,	   including	   value	   for	   money,	   in	   an	  
appropriate	  way	  -­‐	  in	  particular,	  it	  will	  allow	  Member	  States	  to	  authorise	  use	  of	  procedures	  involving	  
negotiation,	   allow	   them	   to	   take	   account	   of	   the	   significant	   benefits	   of	   qualification	   systems,	   and	  
facilitate	  cost-­‐effective	  approaches	   to	  advertising	  contracts.	   Further,	  and	  of	  much	   importance,	   the	  
approach	   advocated	   will	   greatly	   reduce	   the	   complexities	   and	   uncertainties	   that	   apply	   under	   the	  
current	   regulatory	   regime.	   This	   will	   result	   both	   from	   the	   greater	   simplicity	   of	   the	   content	   of	   the	  
utilities	   rules	  as	  compared	  with	   the	   rules	   that	  apply	  under	   the	  other	  directives,	  and	   from	  the	  very	  
existence	   of	   a	   single	   regime,	   which,	   inter	   alia,	   will	   eliminate	   the	   need	   to	   operate	   under	  multiple	  
regimes	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  boundaries	  between	  them.	  Thus	  this	  approach	  will	  promote	  both	  the	  
flexibility	   and	   simplification	   objective	   of	   the	   current	   reform	   agenda	   whilst	   at	   the	   same,	   it	   is	  
submitted,	   providing	   a	   suitable	   framework	   of	   rules	   for	   promoting	   the	   single	   market	   in	   public	  
procurement	  in	  Europe.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Based	  on	  Case	  31/87,	  Gebroeders	  Beentjes	  BV	  v	  Netherlands	  ("Beentjes")	  [1988]	  ECR	  4635.	  For	  elaboration	  
on	  this	  point	  see	  	  S.	  Arrowsmith,	  “Application	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  and	  Directives	  to	  Horizontal	  Policies:	  a	  Critical	  
Review”,	  ch.4	  in	  Arrowsmith	  and	  Kunzlik	  (eds),	  note	  23	  above,	  at	  8.1.4.	  
	  
	  
